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Job performance aids (JPAs) have been studied for many decades in a variety of 
disciplines and for many different types of tasks, yet this is the first known research 
experiment using JPAs in a quality assurance (QA) context.  The objective of this thesis 
was to assess whether a JPA has an effect on the performance of a QA observer 
performing the concurrent dual verification technique for a basic assembly task. The JPA 
used in this study was a simple checklist, and the design borrows heavily from prior 
research on task analysis and other human factors principles.  The assembly task and QA 
construct of concurrent dual verification are consistent with those of a high consequence 
manufacturing environment. Results showed that the JPA had only a limited effect on QA 
performance in the context of this experiment. However, there were three important and 
unexpected findings that may draw interest from a variety of practitioners. First, a novel 
testing methodology sensitive enough to measure the effects of a JPA on performance 
was created.  Second, the discovery that there are different probabilities of detection for 
different types of error in a QA context may be the most far-reaching results.  Third, 
these results highlight the limitations of concurrent dual verification as a control against 
vii 
 
defects.  It is hoped that both the methodology and results of this study are an effective 
baseline from which to launch future research activities. 
1 
 
 INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1.
According to James Cantrell, the main engineer for the Skipper satellite, “It’s always the 
simple stuff that kills you.”  Skipper failed one day into its mission because Russian 
scientists mistakenly connected the solar panels backwards (“Russians Miswire Satellite”, 
1996), an oversight that could have been avoided with the use of a quality assurance 
(QA) checklist.  A checklist may also have prevented the NASA Genesis probe from 
crash-landing in 2004 when its drogue parachute failed to deploy due to a deceleration 
sensor that was installed backwards (“Official: Genesis Pre-Launch”, 2006). These 
examples remind us that even simple human errors can have large consequences, and 
though human error can never completely be eliminated we can nonetheless introduce 
processes and tools that are designed to prevent errors or to catch errors and minimize 
their impact.  
 
One purpose of checklists is to support either simple or complex actions that are subject 
to the limitations of human performance.  In the delivery of a product or activity, an 
overarching goal for quality assurance and human factors professionals is often the 
prevention of defects, and this becomes equally as important as it is difficult when 
dealing with both complex and critical systems.  People who are present during high 
consequence failures (or near misses) always remember the story and are extremely 
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unlikely to repeat the same mistakes, a concept best captured by Vilfredo Pareto in 1870: 
“Give me a fruitful error any time, full of seeds, bursting with its own corrections” (from 
Comment on Kepler, quoted in Helmreich and Merritt, 2001).  A checklist often is a 
lesson intended for an audience that was not present during a mishap who should learn 
the failure mechanisms in order to avoid them.  This study examines how a checklist (a 
specific type of job performance aid, or JPA) may affect human performance in the 




The author’s original intent in selecting a thesis topic was to bridge the QA and human 
factors disciplines, because his work experience resides in the former and major field of 
study is in the latter.  Consultations with staff in the Human Factors department at Sandia 
National Laboratories (SNL) revealed an internal paper titled “The Effectiveness of 
Verification in Industrial Applications” (Stevens-Adams et al., 2013) that reviews the 
academic and applied literature on the verification construct, variables underlying its 
effectiveness, and the applications that are best suited to a particular work environment.  
The paper cites different definitions of verification from Department of Energy (DOE) 
standards and handbooks, including the concurrent dual verification technique that is 
utilized by the Surety Engineering Group1 at SNL in its high consequence manufacturing 
environments (DOE, 1993; DOE, 2009) whereby a QA observer is present to witness 
                                                 
1 “Surety” encompasses a number of disciplines related to nuclear weapons such as safety, reliability, 
quality, human factors, and assessment, and is a term not widely used outside of SNL.  The Surety 
Engineering Group is staffed primarily by quality engineers. 
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activities being performed.  In consultation with SNL and Purdue advisors, it was 
determined that there has been a dearth of research on the concurrent dual verification 
technique and that an appropriate thesis topic would be to address this particular QA task. 
 
An episode from the author’s past involved mentoring an inexperienced QA checker to 
verify assembly tasks for a high consequence product, including questions about how to 
specifically complete these tasks.  This particular incident related to the performance of 
concurrent dual verification led to the selection of a job performance aid as the focus of 
this thesis, and more specifically an examination of checklist aids in QA.  After 
performing a cursory literature search on JPAs, it was initially determined that the topic 
of JPAs related to QA tasks had not previously been studied.  A more thorough search of 
the JPA literature eventually located a detailed experiment (Shriver et al., 1982) that 
studied the effect of JPAs on eight (8) different tasks within a nuclear power plant, one of 
which was specific to QA.  However, the QA-focused JPA was eventually dropped from 
the Shriver study as being too task-interdependent and reliant upon wider functional 
understanding from an expert operator.  The project director (L. Zach, personal 
communication, June 2013) and lead principal investigator (E.L. Shriver, personal 
communication, June 2013) of the 1982 report have been located and verified that, to 
their knowledge, no other research on JPAs for QA has ever been published. 
 
This research study is therefore a nexus for multiple interests: the design and use of 
checklists to improve human performance, the linkage of human factors and QA 
4 
 
techniques for defect prevention, and a continuation of both previous and existing 
research.  In addition to academic discoveries, this study of JPAs can benefit a wide-
ranging audience of practitioners as a tool for reducing the likelihood of high 
consequence events that still happen in every-day life; rockets and satellites continue to 
fail (Cheng et al., 2009), medical errors lead to tragic results (Dhillon, 2008), and in fact 
lives could even be saved by implementing a checklist (Haynes et al., 2009).  This topic 
has such an impact that it has even spawned a New York Times bestseller The Checklist 
Manifesto (Gawande, 2010) that has drawn popular interest on an international level. 
 
1.2 Research Statement 
Since this was the first known study that examined the use of JPAs for the QA role, the 
primary research focus was to determine whether a simple JPA (i.e., checklist) has an 
effect on QA performance, and then only on the concurrent dual verification technique.  
Once the experimental design was chosen, additional hypotheses were tested regarding 
independent variables and an important test assumption that was inadvertently germane 
to the results.  
 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
This thesis consists of six chapters.  Chapter 2 examines prior research on JPAs in a 
variety of disciplines, especially human factors, and provides definitions of concurrent 
dual verification in a QA context.  Chapter 3 explains the methodologies used in the 
design of the experiment, as well as the JPA itself.  Chapter 4 presents results and 
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analysis of the data while Chapter 5 discusses the key implications of the study.  Chapter 
6 presents conclusions and recommends future studies regarding the effect of different 
JPA formats on QA performance, as well as their potential to affect other QA tools and 






  LITERATURE REVIEW CHAPTER 2.
Probably the best-known JPA is the pilot’s checklist, which was born on October 30, 
1935 at Wright Air Field in Dayton, Ohio during the initial test flight of the Boeing 
Model 299 aircraft (which later became the B-17 “Flying Fortress”). The Model 299 
crashed after take-off, killing two of the 5 crewmen.  The accident investigation board 
determined that no mechanical failures had occurred and that the aircraft crashed because 
the pilot forgot to unlock the elevator and rudder locks.  The Model 299 was substantially 
more complex than previous aircraft and simply too much for one pilot to remember how 
to fly, so the approach at the time was to simplify this complexity with a pilot’s checklist 
(Meilinger, 2004; Gawande, 2010).   
 
Over the next few decades research on JPAs would be conducted in a variety of 
disciplines, beginning with U.S. Air Force behavioral research in the 1950s.  From 1951 
to 1956 the Air Force Behavioral Science Laboratory, at the re-named Wright-Patterson 
Air Force Base in Dayton, contracted the human factors specialists at the American 
Institute for Research to study how behavioral and psychological factors could be 
identified and then used to design training requirements for specific tasks (Miller, 1953).  
It was during this study that Dr. Edgar Shriver coined the term “task analysis” to specify 
the need to identify stimulus elements, or behavioral cues, that indicate when a task is 
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complete and then place these directly into training instructions (Shriver et al., 1982).  
Newman (1957) and Miller (1956), under contract to the Air Force Personnel and 
Training Research Center in Denver, Colorado, also recognized the need to identify 
specific behavioral processes to improve both accuracy and training time and then elicit 
these processes into clear and concise instructions that are compatible with the skills and 
abilities of the users.   
 
Task analysis was widely adopted and matured by a variety of practitioners, but 
behavioral cues and the role of behavioral processes were not always used due to 
inconsistent applications of the technique as new task analysis methodologies were 
developed (Davies, 1973; Stammers et al., 1990).  For example, Mager (1962) renamed 
the stimulus elements as “conditions” and this resulted in the stimulus term often being 
misinterpreted as environmental (e.g. temperature) or setup conditions to the experiment; 
as a result the behavioral stimulus elements were often lost (Shriver et al., 1982).  
 
In 1969 the Special Interest Group on Task Analysis of the Human Factors Society 
(chaired by Shriver) counted over 80 variations of task analysis in use at the time; in 
many instances the behavioral cues were missing.  This led to the sub-categorization of 
task analysis methods into more specific methodologies such as basic task analysis 
(Miller, 1953), job analysis (Chapanis, 1970), functional analysis (Shriver, 1960), and 
link analysis (Thomson, 1972). A major output of the interest group’s effort was the 
establishment of the behavioral task analysis (BTA) technique that returned the stimulus 
element to task analysis.  The BTA technique was later codified in a U.S. Air Force 
8 
 
technical report (Shriver, 1975) that would also serve as an important milestone in the 
development of JPAs.   
 
The first research activities that specifically used the term “job performance aid” began 
with more U.S. military contracts in the late 1950s and early 1960s in conjunction with 
task analysis (e.g. Shriver, Fink, & Trexler, 1959; Folley, 1961; Folley & Shettel, 1962; 
Goff et al., 1969).  Over the next two decades JPAs were being studied in a variety of 
contexts.  The early military studies tended to look for ways to reduce errors in complex 
tasks that were not often performed correctly (such as repair and maintenance activities) 
or to shorten the training time necessary for novice technicians to acquire such skills 
(Gebhard, 1970; Elliott & Joyce, 1971; Foley, 1972).  Later studies were refined to 
determine how different JPA formats (pictures or printed text) could convey information 
differently and were therefore better suited for particular circumstances (Booher, 1975; 
Smillie, 1978; Smillie & Ayoub, 1980).  Throughout these experiments the JPA was 
found to be an effective tool at simplifying tasks for novice users that would normally 
require extensive training or complex information processing, and errors in human 
performance were reduced significantly. These experiences led to a variety of 
specifications (Folley et al., 1971; Joyce et al., 1973a; Shriver, 1975) and handbooks 
(Joyce et al., 1973b; Booher, 1978; Smillie, 1985) to assist developers in creating 
effective JPAs for a wide variety of tasks in both military and commercial industries.  
 
Meanwhile, specific industries were conducting their own studies on the limitations of 
human performance.  McKenzie (1958) was an early proponent of having clear standards 
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and instructions in order to improve the accuracy and consistency of inspectors.  This 
followed with more than three decades of research from the industrial inspection 
community (summarized in detail by Fox, 1973; Wiener, 1975, Drury, 1982, and See, 
2012), with some of it focused on vigilance theory (e.g. Elliott, 1960; McGrath and 
Harabedian, 1961; Mackie, 1964; Baddeley and Colquhoun, 1969, Tsao, Drury, and 
Morawski, 1979; Tsao and Wang, 1984; Murray and Caldwell, 1996) that stemmed from 
the pioneering work of Mackworth (1950).  These studies were paralleled by researchers 
who began to understand the underlying models of human information processing that 
would become useful to JPA developers (Gagne, 1962; Kibler, 1965; Harris, 1969, 
Norman, 1981; Rasmussen, 1982; Norman, 1983; Rasmussen and Vicente, 1989; Reason, 
1990; Barshi and Healy, 1993; Allen and Rankin, 1997).  
 
Following the Three Mile Island accident (Kemeny, 1979) the nuclear power industry 
commissioned a series of studies to understand and eliminate the potential for human 
errors, and JPA research experienced a resurgence of interest (Clark, 1982; Shriver et al., 
1982; Mattson, 1989; Hallbert et al., 1992).  In the years since, other high consequence 
industries such as commercial aviation and medicine have followed suit by embracing a 
JPA focused approach (most notably checklists) as well as wider principles of error 
management, human factors, and quality assurance (Helmreich and Schaefer, 1994; 
Helmreich, 2000; Helmreich and Merritt, 2001; Haynes et al., 2009; Gawande, 2010; 




SNL designs and builds a variety of high consequence products, however its primary 
mission is with nuclear weapons.  SNL is therefore subject to the guidance and oversight 
by the Department of Energy (DOE).  As reviewed in Stevens-Adams (2013), the DOE 
Human Performance Handbook (DOE, 2009) focuses on tools and methods for 
preventing and mitigating human error, including processes specifically related to 
verification activities that are useful for quality assurance: 
 Self-Checking – A process by which the performer pauses to reflect on the 
intended action and its expected outcome, whether the proposed action is correct 
for the situation, and resolve any questions or concerns before proceeding by 
using the STAR (Stop, Think, Act, Review) practice. 
 Peer Checking – A series of actions by 2 individuals working together at the 
same time and place, before and during a specific action, as an augmentation but 
not a replacement for self-checking. 
 Concurrent Verification – A series of actions by 2 individuals, at the same time 
and place, to separately confirm the condition before, during, and after an action, 
when the consequences of an incorrect condition would subsequently lead to 
undesired harm. 
 Independent Verification – A process by which one individual, separated by 
time and distance from the action, confirms the desired condition. 
 Peer Review – A process by which qualified reviewers read and check the quality 
of another’s work, and is an informal technique that does not supplant required 




As further discussed in Stevens-Adams (2013), DOE Order 422.1, Conduct of 
Operations, requires independent and concurrent dual verification techniques to be 
implemented for critical equipment configurations.  These two techniques are further 
defined in the DOE Guide to Good Practices for Independent Verification (DOE, 1993): 
 Independent Verification – The act of checking, by a separate qualified person, 
that a given operation or the position of a component conforms to established 
criteria. 
 Concurrent Dual Verification – A method of checking an operation, an act of 
positioning, or a calculation in which the verifier independently observes and/or 
confirms the activity. 
 
There has been a divergence between the term inspector, which implies an independent 
reviewer of a particular item or task, and checker that is specified by the verification 
techniques.  As a result of the above definitions (plus the fact that this study is about 
check-lists), the term checker will be used throughout this paper to refer to the QA role 
being performed by the experimental participants.   
 
The motivation for this study should now be understood as an intersection between the 
complementary disciplines of human factors and QA (itself derived from the tradition of 
inspection), with a focus on the concurrent dual verification activity within high 
consequence environments. The JPA approach continues a contemporary interest in 
checklists while leveraging the legacy techniques of task analysis, plus it is one of many 
tools that a QA practitioner can use as a control against the risk of defects.  The 
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concurrent dual verification JPA thus fills a research void and should draw interest from a 




 METHODOLOGY CHAPTER 3.
This chapter describes the methodology and approach used for the research study. 
Section 3.1 specifies the approach behind the selection of the experimental task and 
presents an appropriate and novel test apparatus as a contribution to the wider body of 
knowledge.  Section 3.2 explains the experimental design.  Section 3.3 explains how the 
number of experimental participants was determined and Section 3.4 discusses the 
selection of participants and the presentation of the experiment.  Section 3.5 details the 
rationale and configuration of the job performance aid used in this study.   
 
3.1 Experimental Task Selection 
The primary emphasis of the original research question is on the effectiveness of a JPA 
on a concurrent dual verification task.  However, there must be a task for the QA 
checkers to observe such that they can perform concurrent dual verification.  Basic 
guidelines for selecting this task were as follows: 
 Not be too complex or time-consuming 
 Not be too simple, such that the ability to inject faults would be difficult as they 
would be too obvious 
14 
 
 Be consistent with a task that may be conducted in a high consequence 
manufacturing environment  
 
A predefined Lego™ assembly task (with visual assembly instructions) was determined 
to satisfy these conditions, with a corresponding checklist for the QA checker to follow 
(or have absent in the control condition).  An advantage of selecting a Lego™ assembly 
task over more applied techniques (such as repairing a lawnmower engine or replacing a 
circuit board in a personal computer) is that there is not any built-in covariance of prior 
knowledge for experimental participants who may have expertise in these applied tasks.  
In other words, selecting simple tasks would reduce uncontrolled differences in 
participant expertise. Another advantage is the similarity of the Lego™ task with those 
conducted in a high consequence manufacturing environment.  Assemblers are often 
provided with a kit of similar-looking parts (e.g., fasteners of different size but equal 
length) and instructions how to install them, and in many real-world applications there is 
a QA checker to oversee the task and ensure that no errors are made. 
 
A within-subjects design model was chosen in order for participants to have their 
performance evaluated both with and without the checklist, so this drove the need for a 
second assembly task.  Due to the potential for learning effects, two different Lego™ 
assembly tasks (Pattern A, Pattern B) were identified in which faults could be introduced 
by the inclusion of incorrect pieces into the patterns.  Another variable to be reasonably 
controlled is the difference in size or complexity between the two patterns.  This 
constraint eliminated many of the popular Lego™ patterns from contention, such as 
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Lego™ City or themed sets like Star Wars™ or super heroes, since the ability to equalize 
both size and complexity across two patterns is difficult.  Further, defined patterns with 
uniquely shaped pieces typically require all parts to be used during assembly (i.e., there 
are no pieces left over).  This might make it too obvious to inject faults into these 
complex patterns.  The option chosen for this experimental task was to select two similar 
but existing patterns (so the instructions were already developed and available) and then 
combine them into a larger boxed kit (thus each pattern was a sub-assembly within the 
larger kit). 
 
Pattern A (see Appendix A) has 104 pieces with 7 of them specifically chosen for 
inserting a fault.  Pattern B (see Appendix B) has 150 pieces, with another 7 pieces 
specifically chosen for inserting a fault.  Since one of the constraints is to avoid selecting 
a task that is too simple, the patterns were not assembled as stand-alone kits but instead 
contained within a larger set of pieces that may or may not be used in either sub-
assembly. This eliminates the potential confound where the QA checker might notice that 
an “incorrect” part was used if there are supposed to be no pieces remaining when the 
assembly task is completed.  The total number of available pieces needs to be higher than 
both sub-assemblies combined, with additional margin such that there is sufficient 
uncertainty in the experiment to warrant the use of a JPA.  Since the total number of 
pieces in Pattern A and Pattern B is 254 (almost 256 = 27 or 7 bits of information), a total 
assembly kit of 512 pieces was chosen since 512 = 29 or 9 bits of potential information 




However, the total number of bits of information is much higher than 9 bits when 
considering the different part shapes (23 for Pattern A), colors (6 for Pattern A), and 
markings that each act as multipliers to the total number of possible combinations of parts 
within the two patterns.  This large number is roughly doubled when adding in Pattern B, 
and doubled again when considering parts not used in either pattern.  Thus there is 
tremendous (and sufficient) uncertainty in the kit of 512 parts that experimental 
participants were not able to determine the total number of pieces being used for each 
pattern.  If the JPA effectively improves the chances that the correct piece in the correct 
color and correct shape is installed in the correct way, and it is “infused” (Oberhettinger, 
2012) at the correct time and correct place in the assembly process, then it would be a 
tremendously useful tool to support concurrent dual verification in mitigating human 
error. 
 
In order to more fully describe the correct piece / correct place discussion above, consider 
that each of the 512 pieces belongs to only one of the following five part groups: 
 Parts used only in Pattern A: 52 pieces 
 Parts used only in Pattern B: 98 pieces 
 Parts that exist in both patterns A and B: 104 pieces (or 52 in both patterns) 
 “Incorrect” parts that are used to interject faults into both patterns: 9 pieces (see 
Appendix C) 




To further clarify, Pattern A has 52 pieces that are unique and 52 that are also used in 
Pattern B, for a total of 104 pieces.  Pattern B has 98 pieces that are unique and 52 that 
are also used in Pattern A, for a total of 150 pieces.  Mutual exclusivity of the five part 
groups allows exact probabilities to be determined for analysis and compared to 
experimental results.  The inclusion of both patterns in the kit of 512 pieces, as well as 
the decision to not return the first pattern’s pieces to the kit before commencing with the 
second pattern in the trial, are counterbalanced by the randomized assignment of 
participants to one of the four test conditions.   
 
3.2 Test Approach 
In the Lego™ assembly task described in Section 3.1, experimental participants 
performed the role of QA checker and the author acted as the assembler of the patterns. A 
distinction was made between an error by the assembler that was purposely made (fault) 
in order to elicit experimental data and an error that was unintentionally made (mistake) 
and is less germane to the results.  However, the use of the term “error” was necessary in 
providing instructions to the checkers because they correctly identified both faults and 
mistakes during the experiment without any knowledge of the difference between the 
two.  The instructions given to the participant before the test began were: “Please let me 
know if you notice any errors. “ When a fault was made and the QA checker did not 
notice, this was defined as a miss; if they did notice, it was defined as a detection.  Some 
faults were detected immediately, but others were detected later in the assembly process.  
This difference was anticipated and considered important to the results, so there needed 
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to be a way to distinguish between the two responses.  While the identification of a fault 
before turning the page in the assembly instructions is a detection, if the fault was 
identified after the page was turned it was determined to be a catch.  A false alarm 
occurred when an error (fault or mistake) was not performed but the QA checker notified 
the assembler that they thought one had occurred. If the assembler intentionally disguised 
a fault from the QA checker then it was classified as a violation (though the experiment 
was designed to eliminate the risk of violations and none were present in the results). 
Finally, sequence errors are a special type of false alarm that is similar to Norman’s 
(1981) mode error, where the response is incorrect and represents a user assuming a state 
other than the true state of the task.  These definitions, specific to this study and not 
necessarily in common use elsewhere, are summarized in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Definitions Used in the Assembly Task 
Fault 
An intentional and specific error that is introduced by the 
assembler 
Mistake An unintentional error by the assembler 
Error The use of an incorrect piece or incorrect assembly order 
Miss An error that is not noticed by the QA checker; includes catches 
Detection 
Before turning the next page of the assembly instructions, the 
QA checker identifies an error 
Catch 
An error that is noticed by the QA checker later (after the page 
has been turned) 
False alarm 
Any response from the QA checker when there is no error 
present 
Violation 
A fault that is purposely hidden from the QA checker, such that 
there is not an opportunity to notice it  
Sequence error 
The QA checker verbally authorizes the assembler to turn the 
page of the instructions before the assembly task on that page 




Faults were inserted by the assembler into both patterns in specific pre-determined 
locations, with the pre-test instruction that the QA checker observe the assembly task and 
tell the assembler if they noticed any errors.  The fault types are: 
1. Marking Fault: Insert the incorrect piece that has markings.  For example, instead 
of inserting the “correct” 2 x 2 yellow piece another 2 x 2 yellow piece with a 
pattern on one side is installed. 
2. Incorrect Piece: Insert the incorrect piece(s) but with no markings.  For example, 
instead of inserting the “correct” 2 x 4 black piece two 1 x 4 black pieces is 
installed. 
3. Wrong Order: Insert the correct piece(s) but in the incorrect configuration. For 
example, instead of constructing a 2 x 10 wall with a 2 x 8 piece on the left and a 
2 x 2 piece on the right, the order is switched and the 2 x 2 piece goes on the left 
4. Wrong Orientation: Insert the correct piece(s) but in the wrong location or 
orientation.  For example, a window piece is installed backwards, or offset by one 
row from what the “correct” orientation is. 
 
The fault types were chosen for their reasonable similarity to those that occur in high 
consequence environments.  For example, fault type 4 (wrong orientation) is similar to a 
component being installed backwards on a printed circuit board.  The author has past 
experience with fault type 1, dating from an incident whereby a damaged part with 
noticeable indications of wear was nearly installed onto a larger assembly.  The specific 
faults in the Lego™ assembly task were only selected for their ease of insertion and 
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ability to avoid detection by the QA checker, and were not equally spaced throughout the 
assembly task.  These faults are further detailed in Section 3.4. 
 
The independent variables are as follows: 
 Pattern order (A first or B first) 
 JPA (present or not present) 
 
Uncontrolled variables (potential covariants) that were observed are: 
 Pattern A elapsed time 
 Pattern B elapsed time 
 Patterns A and B combined elapsed time 
 Fault type  
 
Because the errors (both faults and mistakes) are performed by the assembler they are 
independent of the presence or absence of the JPA.  Therefore the responses from the 
participant (the QA checker) represent the primary dependent variables for this study.  
For purposes of simplifying the statistical design the dependent variables have been 
categorized as described above and summarized into only 3 response levels: 1) 
detections; 2) misses, and 3) false alarms. 
 
The primary purpose of this experiment is to determine whether or not the JPA has an 




H1: The presence of a JPA has no effect on the detection of faults in the quality assurance 
role. 
 
with the alternative hypothesis being: 
 
H1A: The presence of a JPA has an effect on the detection of errors in the quality 
assurance role. 
 
The following additional hypotheses are being tested in this experiment, specifically 
addressing the independent variables listed previously: 
 
H2: There is no difference in the detection of faults with a JPA than without a JPA. 
H2A: There is a difference in the detection of faults with a JPA than without a JPA. 
 
H3: The order of presentation of the JPA has no effect on the detection of faults in the 
quality assurance role. 
H3A: The order of presentation of the JPA has an effect on the detection of faults in the 
quality assurance role. 
 
H4: The order of presentation of the different patterns has no effect on the detection of 
faults in the quality assurance role. 
H4A: The order of presentation of the different patterns has an effect on the detection of 
faults in the quality assurance role. 
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An additional hypothesis, H5, is explained in the next section. 
 
3.3 Sample Size Determination 
The minimum number of participants was determined from the estimated probability of 
detecting each fault, with different values estimated for with and without a JPA.  The 
different probabilities of detection among the 14 total faults span a fuzzy range between 
somewhat-easy and somewhat-difficult, and the added complexity of 4 different fault 
types with uneven placement throughout the two patterns made it necessary to create 
simplifying assumptions for both easier statistical analyses and a testable hypothesis.  
The probabilistic Rasch (1960) model, which in turn requires an ordered index based on 
the Guttman (1944) scale, is an appropriate guide for this experiment as it models the 
trade-off between the QA checker’s abilities and the difficulty of detecting each fault.   
 
One simplifying assumption was to assign a constant average probability of detection 
across all fault instances.  Since the checklist specifically identified the 4 different fault 
types, it was reasonable to assume that the average probability of detection is p1=0.5 
without a JPA and p2=0.9 with a JPA. The number of experimental participants (n) must 
be a multiple of 4 to match the number of test conditions (listed in Section 3.1) and 
therefore make the experiment balanced.  For n*14 binary trials (n*7 with a JPA and n*7 
without a JPA), the probability of concluding that there is a difference when p1=p2 




Table 2: Probability of Correctly Concluding that p2>p1 
n Type-1 error of 0.05 Type-1 error of 0.025 
4 0.96 0.93 
8 0.9995 0.998 
12     ~1 0.99998 
≥16       ~1 
 
This analysis suggests a minimum sample size of eight participants.  However, the 
simplifying assumption of average probability of detection across the individual 14 faults 
suggests that this number should be higher.  Once the experimental trials began it soon 
became apparent that the addition of more participants was not particularly onerous on 
the assembler or support staff and could be accomplished in a reasonably short 
timeframe.  Thus the number of participants for this experiment was raised to 24.  In 
addition, the assumption of an average probability of detection being uniformly 
distributed across the experiment is an additional hypothesis to be tested: 
 
H5: The probability of detection for each fault is equal. 
H5A: The probability of detection for each fault is not equal. 
 
3.4 Test Procedure 
Participants consisted of permanent and contract employees (14 males, 10 females) from 
SNL.  Candidates who perform QA activities as part of their normal job responsibilities 
were specifically excluded from this study, so all QA checkers were considered novices 
in this role. The experiment was conducted in a video recording studio to facilitate both 
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the capture of the assembly tasks and audio of the QA checker’s interactions with the 
assembler.  The video camera was placed such that all responses were recorded but not 
the faces of participants, in order to maintain confidentiality of participation. Figure 1 
shows the test setup from one of the experimental trials with the assembler on the left and 
the QA checker seated off-camera on the right. 
Figure 1: Test Setup 
 
The assembly instructions were printed and used by the assembler in clear view of the 
QA checker, along with the collection of 512 pieces.  These assembly instructions were 
the original instructions for each pattern developed by Lego™, with no changes or 
additions.  The pre-test instructions given verbally to the QA checkers (only once, before 
the first pattern was presented) were to observe the assembly task and report any errors as 
soon as they were noticed, and not to touch any of the Lego™ pieces or assist the 
assembler in locating them.  Participant #7 was disqualified due to misunderstanding the 
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pre-test instructions.  Another participant was recruited to replace #7 prior to the 
completion of the study, maintaining a total of 24 valid participants.  
 
For one of the two assembly tasks in each experimental trial, the checklist was provided 
for review beforehand and was available throughout the duration of that assembly task.  
Table 3 summarizes how the order of patterns varied across the 24 participants.  By 
varying the order of assembly in this way, specific effects of the presence of a JPA (if 
they exist) can be distinguished from the effects of sequence of assembly (H2 – H3). 
 
Table 3: Grouping of Experimental Participants By Sequence of Assembly 
Number of 
Participants 
Sequence of Assembly, Presence of JPA Abbreviation 
6 Pattern A without JPA, followed by Pattern B with JPA A{JB} 
6 Pattern A with JPA, followed by Pattern B without JPA {JA}B 
6 Pattern B without JPA, followed by Pattern A with JPA B{JA} 
6 Pattern B with JPA, followed by Pattern A without JPA {JB}A 
 
As explained earlier in Section 3.2, the assembler intentionally inserted faults in 14 
specific locations (seven in each pattern) and there were four different types of faults.  
Table 4 summarizes the specific faults and associated fault types; raw data results appear 



























Figure 2 shows the specific page from the assembly instructions during which Fault #1 
was inserted; fault #1 was also fault type 1. The arrow points to the white 1 X 2 Lego™ 
piece that was chosen for replacement with one of identical shape and color, except with 




Figure 2: Sample Instructions Page, Depicting Fault #1 (Fault Type 1) 
 
The actual replacement of this piece in an experimental trial is shown by the arrow in 
Figure 3, where markings are shown on the back side of the part that is facing away from 
the QA checker. During experimental design it was thought that pieces with markings 
would be too easily noticeable if they were facing the checker, so it was determined that 
most of them would face in a different direction. As a counterbalance against these faults 
then becoming too difficult to notice, all pieces with markings were placed face-up on the 
table during the trial such that the QA checker would have the opportunity to notice them.   
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Figure 3: Fault #1 Occurring in an Experimental Trial 
 
All four fault types are illustrated in Appendix F.  The complete set of assembly 
instructions appear in Appendix H (Pattern A) and Appendix I (Pattern B). Note that 
some pages appear lighter in contrast than others; these pages were purposely altered in 
order to more accurately identify the black pieces. While most pages depict black pieces 
it was important to clearly identify those pieces on the page of instructions in which they 
were installed, to eliminate any confusion.  This was deemed an important activity in 
order to remove the confound of the QA checker’s visual acuity, and it was especially 
important for Fault #8 where a 2 X 4 black piece was replaced by two 1 X 4 black pieces. 




3.5 Job Performance Aid 
This experiment was designed to focus not on the Lego™ assembly task itself but rather 
the effectiveness of a JPA for the experimental participant that is performing the role of 
the QA checker.  Prior JPA research (Miller, 1956; Gebhard, 1970; Elliott & Joyce, 1971; 
Foley, 1972; Clark, 1982; Shriver et al., 1982, Barshi & Healy, 1993) has studied the use 
of JPAs with both novice and expert users, but there is general agreement that they are 
most effective as training aids for novice users.  Some common themes in the literature 
proved useful in the development of the checklist for this study:   
 The focus is on the user.  JPA developers should use task analysis techniques to 
fully understand the job function and the behaviors used when the task is 
performed (Gebhard, 1970; Clark, 1982; Shriver et al, 1982; Smillie, 1985).   
 Information must be task oriented. The JPA should identify exactly what the 
user needs to do using brief, concise, and explicit instructions to aid short term 
memory.  Instructions should be directive and action-specific using simplified and 
standard language, and contain only information that is necessary (McKenzie, 
1958; Gebhard, 1970; Clark, 1982; Shriver et al., 1982; Smillie, 1985; Hallbert et 
al., 1992; Gawande, 2010) 
 
The JPA for this experiment (see Appendix D) consists of a short, concise, and simple 
checklist intended to elicit behaviors that would enhance the detection of faults in this 
experiment.  Each of the six checklist items was considered to be essential information, 
with the following rationale: 
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 Your role as an observer is an essential part of this important task. Complex 
assemblies require a second set of eyes in order to catch any errors. It is the 
author’s experience that novice QA checkers do not always recognize the 
importance of simply being an observer for an important task.  McKenzie (1958) 
noted that inspection takes place in a social context where there may be different 
‘social norms’ of rejection, which is consistent with the author noting that subject 
matter experts who perform the work may sometimes resent a non-expert 
“checking their work.”  In addition, Wiener (1975) reminds us of Herzberg’s 
(1966) theory of industrial motivation and quotes Lucaccini et al. (1968) where 
subjects receiving more positively-toned instructions detected more signals. 
 Pay attention for the following types of error. Both Clark (1982) and White et al. 
(2010) recommend that hazards or high-risk concerns have their own specific 
checklist items, though to avoid confusion the four fault types were addressed in 
only three statements. 
 Feel free to ask questions about the task at any time. If necessary, ask the 
assembler to stop until you are comfortable with proceeding. This statement was 
intended to build the QA checker’s confidence by signaling that they are vital to 
the assembly process and could stop it at any time.  It also grants permission to 
talk to the assembler and not be considered a distraction. 
  The assembler should not turn to the next page of the instructions without your 
approval. This statement was necessary to establish the event horizon at which a 
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detection becomes a catch.  The specific emphasis on catches was kept from the 
QA checker as it would have introduced a confound. 
 For each page of the instructions, the order of assembly does not matter. To avoid 
confusion that could have led to an increase in false alarms, this statement needed 
to be explicit. 
 The box contains 512 total parts.  Some parts will be used and some will not. This 
statement eliminates the confound whereby the QA checker could use the 
presence or absence of parts on the table as a cue. 
 
Clark (1982), Shriver et al. (1982), and Smillie (1985) are emphatic that the key final step 
in successful development of a JPA is verification and validation with expert users.  The 
process relies heavily on these reviews to identify and correct procedural ambiguities, 
omissions, and inaccuracies, and depending on the complexity of the JPA the process 
may require multiple iterations.  For the simple and concise checklist in this experiment, 
the author conducted a pilot study with four QA experts in the Surety Engineering Group 
at SNL for additional guidance and a final verification of the checklist format.  The study 
was approved (before the pilot study) by both the SNL and Purdue University 
Institutional Review Boards under protocols SNL1349 and IRB00001150, respectively. 
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 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS CHAPTER 4.
Binary responses for 14 fault observations were recorded for each participant, and are 
summarized in Table 5.  Participant #7 was disqualified due to misunderstanding the pre-
test instructions and was replaced with participant #25.  The three Pattern B instances 
where only 6 trials appeared were from incorrect assembly and the planned fault could 
not be inserted.  Note that participant #1 detected every fault in both patterns.  
 












1 7 7 7 7 100%
2 7 5 6 5 77%
3 7 4 7 3 50%
4 7 7 6 3 77%
5 7 6 6 4 77%
6 7 5 7 4 64%
8 7 4 7 5 64%
9 7 6 7 5 79%
10 7 5 7 7 86%
11 7 3 7 4 50%
12 7 3 7 4 50%
13 7 3 7 4 50%
14 7 3 7 6 64%
15 7 4 7 4 57%
16 7 4 7 5 64%
17 7 6 7 3 64%
18 7 3 7 4 50%
19 7 4 7 2 43%
20 7 4 7 3 50%
21 7 4 7 5 64%
22 7 4 7 5 64%
23 7 4 7 5 64%
24 7 3 7 3 43%
25 7 4 7 3 50%  
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Table 6 summarizes the results for each particular fault. The three instances of incorrect 
assembly are seen again where two of the trials associated with fault #8 and one trial with 
fault #11 were deemed to be a “no test”.  It is noteworthy that fault #2, fault #4, and fault 
#11 were always detected while fault #1, fault #6, fault #7, fault #10, and fault #14 were 
frequently missed.  The members of the latter group (#1, #6, #7, #10, and #14) are all 
marking faults (fault type 1); however, fault #12 (also fault type 1) was specifically 
designed to be noticed and, as expected, frequently detected2.    
 












A 1 1 24 5 21%
A 2 3 24 24 100%
A 3 3 24 23 96%
A 4 3 24 24 100%
A 5 4 24 17 71%
A 6 1 24 6 25%
A 7 1 24 6 25%
B 8 2 22 15 68%
B 9 4 24 21 88%
B 10 1 24 5 21%
B 11 3 23 23 100%
B 12 1 24 20 83%
B 13 2 24 17 71%
B 14 1 24 2 8%  
 
Using the performance summaries in Table 5 and Table 6 as a guide, binary logistic 
regression (Agresti, 2013) was used to model the probability of detecting a fault as a 
                                                 
2 This intentionally-noticeable fault was designed to address the vigilance decrement noted by Tsao, 
Drury,and  Morawski (1984) where a subject’s expectations of finding another defect appeared to decrease 
immediately after a defect had been found. However, hypotheses related to vigilance theory were later 
dropped from this study. 
34 
 
function of the experimental factors.  In logistic regression, the probability of 




, , ⋯ , , where p is the number of 
factors. Note that 
, ,⋯,
, ,⋯,
	is commonly referred to as the logit or log odds.  
Here, we further assume that f is a linear combination of the factors.  Collectively, the set 
of values for the experimental factors describes the experimental condition.   
 
Due to the nature of the experiment and the apparent differences in detection ability 
across faults, separate probability models (see Appendix G) were developed for each 
pattern. For Pattern A, faults #2 and #4 were excluded from the models because they 
were always detected and therefore there is no ability to discern an effect of sequence in 
those cases; for Pattern B, fault #11 was excluded for the same reason.  The model form 




,                                                                       (1) 
 
where  represents the log odds at a standard experimental condition (defined by a 
standard error number and a standard sequence) ,  reflects the change in log odds when 
changing the experimental condition  from the standard fault number to fault #i, an d  
reflects the change in log odds when changing the experimental condition from the 
standard sequence to sequence j. In the case of both patterns, the standard sequence is 
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denoted by pattern A, followed by the JPA instructions and then pattern B, or in study 
notation, A{JB} (see Table 3).  In the case of pattern A, fault #1 is the standard fault 
number and in the case of pattern B, fault #8 is the standard fault number.  The form of 
the model allows for an assessment of the effect of the JPA given differences in detection 
ability across fault numbers.  The effect of fault number is compensated for by the  
terms, while the effect of the JPA is associated with the  terms (more on this in Chapter 
5). 
 
Minitab (version 16.1.1) was used to estimate the model parameters for each pattern; the 
complete set of Minitab results appears in Appendix G.  Table 7 and Table 8 display the 
parameter estimates (and associated p-values) related with patterns A and B, respectively.  
The p-values measure whether or not the model terms are significantly (p < 0.05) 
different than zero. 
 
Table 7: Logistic Regression Table, Pattern A  
Parameter        Estimate   SE Estimate   Z-ratio      P-value      
              -2.845      0.810         -3.51        0.000 
             1.792      0.776          2.31        0.021         
             1.999      0.778          2.57        0.010         
             1.578      0.775          2.04        0.042         
               4.967      1.218          4.08        0.000       
               2.494      0.731          3.41        0.001        
               0.251      0.710          0.35        0.724         






Table 8: Logistic Regression Table, Pattern B 
Parameter        Estimate   SE Estimate   Z-ratio      P-value       
               0.893      0.593         1.50         0.132 
             0.350      0.637         0.55         0.582    
            -0.615      0.610        -1.01         0.313    
            -0.187      0.612        -0.31         0.760    
               1.211      0.776         1.56         0.119    
             -2.150      0.691        -3.11         0.002    
              0.870      0.722         1.20         0.228    
              0.132      0.650         0.20         0.839    
             -3.227      0.879        -3.67         0.000    
 
For the various experimental conditions, the fitted model can be used to estimate the 
probability of detection by inverting equation (1) and replacing the parameters with their 
estimates.  For example, suppose that we are interested in the probability of detecting 
fault #1 (pattern A) assuming the standard sequence A{JB}. Then, 
1 ,			 A JB 0.0549 , where 2.845 (from Table 7).  
Further suppose that we are interested in the probability of detecting fault #6 (pattern A) 
assuming the sequence B{JA}. Then, 6 ,			 B JA
0.3095 , where , , 	   are from Table 7.  Table 9 and Table 10 list the 
estimated probabilities of detection (for all experimental conditions) and compare with 
the observed fraction of faults detected for patterns A and B, respectively.  Note that the 
estimated probability of detection matches reasonably well with the observed fraction 
detected for all cases.  The implication is that the predictors contained in the equation (1) 
model contain all of the necessary information, meaning that this is an accurate model for 
the experimental conditions.  The same conclusion was reached from Minitab (see 
Appendix G) using the Pearson (p=0.171), Deviance (p=0.194), and especially Hosmer-
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Lemeshow (p=0.725) formal tests where p-values greater than 0.05 indicate that there is 
no evidence for lack-of-fit and that the model is accurate.  These results would not be 
statistically different from increasing the pool of participants except in the case of a much 
larger number that would be required to detect small differences. 
 








1 A {JB} 0.055 0.000
1 B {JA} 0.259 0.500
1 {JA} B 0.300 0.167
1 {JB} A 0.220 0.167
3 A {JB} 0.893 1.000
3 B {JA} 0.980 1.000
3 {JA} B 0.984 1.000
3 {JB} A 0.976 0.833
5 A {JB} 0.413 0.500
5 B {JA} 0.809 0.500
5 {JA} B 0.839 0.833
5 {JB} A 0.773 1.000
6 A {JB} 0.069 0.000
6 B {JA} 0.310 0.333
6 {JA} B 0.355 0.500
6 {JB} A 0.266 0.167
7 A {JB} 0.069 0.000
7 B {JA} 0.310 0.333
7 {JA} B 0.355 0.333













8 A {JB} 0.709 0.833
8 B {JA} 0.776 0.800
8 {JA} B 0.569 0.400
8 {JB} A 0.670 0.667
9 A {JB} 0.891 0.833
9 B {JA} 0.921 0.833
9 {JA} B 0.816 0.833
9 {JB} A 0.872 1.000
10 A {JB} 0.221 0.167
10 B {JA} 0.288 0.333
10 {JA} B 0.133 0.333
10 {JB} A 0.191 0.000
12 A {JB} 0.854 1.000
12 B {JA} 0.892 0.667
12 {JA} B 0.759 0.833
12 {JB} A 0.829 0.833
13 A {JB} 0.736 0.667
13 B {JA} 0.798 0.833
13 {JA} B 0.601 0.500
13 {JB} A 0.698 0.833
14 A {JB} 0.088 0.000
14 B {JA} 0.121 0.333





 DISCUSSION CHAPTER 5.
The effect of the JPA can be deduced by considering the complete set of estimated  
terms in the model, which represent the 4 test conditions shown in Table 3.  In the case of 
pattern A (see Table 7), note that	 ,	 , and  are all statistically 
significantly non-zero (each with a p-value less than 0.05) and positive, thus implying 
increased probability of detection versus the standard sequence A{JB}.  This means that 
faults in Pattern A were detected less frequently in the standard A{JB} sequence, when 
the Pattern A assembly was observed first and the JPA appeared in the second trial on 
Pattern B. This suggests that the JPA may have had only a limited effect in this 
experiment. Further, the values of the three γ parameter estimates in Table 7 are 
statistically indistinguishable from one another (the standard error estimates are 
essentially identical).  Thus, the probability of detection of Pattern A faults is impacted 
by both the sequence of observation (whether or not the assembly of pattern A was 
observed before the assembly of pattern B) and whether or not a JPA was present.   
 
The only distinguishable effect of the JPA is its presence in a 3-way interaction between 
sequence, presence/absence of a JPA, and Pattern A.  If there was an effect from only the 
JPA, the  and 	 , terms in Table 7 would be statistically significant and positive 
while  would be near zero. These results for Pattern A further suggest that the 
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learning effect has a greater impact than the JPA. In contrast, the effects of sequence 
and/or presence/absence of a JPA on the probability of detection for pattern B (see Table 
8) were not observed (i.e., ,	 , and  were all statistically indistinguishable 
from zero with non-significant p-values). 
 
As seen in Table 6, marking faults (fault type 1) were frequently missed and therefore 
dominate the 3-way interaction term in the results for Pattern A.  This can be seen in the 
β3 term in Table 7 with the statistically significant p-value < 0.0005 and a large positive 
value for the estimate (4.967).  This indicates that for Pattern A, participants were much 
more likely to detect fault #3 (and fault type 3, which is an incorrect-order fault) 
compared to fault #1 (the default condition, as well as a marking fault).  Similarly, the β10 
term for Pattern B in Table 8 is statistically significant (p=0.002) with a large negative 
estimate (-2.150) and signifies that the marking fault #10 was much less likely to be 
detected than the incorrect-piece fault (fault type 2) in the default condition.  This 
suggests that the reason Pattern A appears in the 3-way interaction term is because it has 
more marking errors (even when considering fault #12, which was designed to be 
noticed) and thus gives a better opportunity to detect differences in the probability of 
detection between the different fault types.   
 
Given these results, the primary null hypothesis was not fully rejected: 
 




The effect of the JPA was not statistically significant on its own but rather as part of a 3-
way interaction between sequence of observation, presence of a JPA, and Pattern A. 
Thus, the additional null hypotheses were only partially accepted: 
 
H2: There is no difference in the detection of faults with a JPA than without a JPA. 
H3: The order of presentation of the JPA has no effect on the detection of faults in the 
quality assurance role. 
H4: The order of presentation of the different patterns has no effect on the detection of 
faults in the quality assurance role. 
 
What may be the most intriguing discovery in this study, however, is the ability to reject 
the final null hypothesis: 
 
H5: The probability of detection for each fault is equal. 
 
In hindsight, one weakness in the experimental design is that faults were not evenly 
distributed throughout the individual trial for each pattern, either by elapsed time or 
number of pieces of assembly.  This might have been negligible if the assumption of 
average probability of detection across all faults was realistic; however, this assumption 
was shown to be demonstrably wrong and therefore acted as a confound influencing the 
expected results. Clearly, some fault types in this study were more difficult to detect than 
other fault types.  The discovery that there are different probabilities of detection for 
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different types of error, using this study’s experimental design and within the verification 
context, may be the most useful result from this experiment.   
 
Returning to the original motivation for the study provides a reminder that this research 
project is not just an experiment about Lego™ pieces and JPAs, but also a study of QA 
practices.  In order for QA practitioners to effectively use tools to control risk they must 
be both well designed and well understood by the designer and the user.  Stammers et al. 
(1990) suggests that task analysis methodologies themselves are limited by the difficulty 
of accurately predicting behavior due to the influence of cognitive factors that cannot be 
easily observed or modeled, thus even proper JPA development using task analyses face 
the same limitations. If this study were designed to detect only the main effect of a JPA 
on performance, then the results would have been disappointing and perhaps no 
interaction with other independent variables would have been discovered. These findings 
illustrate that this specific JPA format (i.e., a checklist) is not necessarily an effective 
control to improve the performance of concurrent dual verification activities. Past 
findings (Clark, 1982; Shriver et al., 1982; Smillie, 1985) echo the conclusion of this 
research that no single JPA format is best for all circumstances.  It should also be noted 
that the verification techniques appearing in many guidebooks, such as the DOE Human 
Performance Handbook (DOE, 2009) mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, are presented as 
being effective without any qualifications as to whether they are actually useful or 
conditions under which they must be applied in order to be beneficial.  This study found, 
however, that concurrent dual verification may not always be as effective a technique as 




 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH CHAPTER 6.
The research presented in this thesis is the first known example of evidence-based job 
performance aid (JPA) use in a quality assurance setting.  This study used an assembly 
task and checklist format as the vehicle for the experiment, and incorporated previously 
recognized design principles from the literature into the configuration of the JPA. The 
design of the task included some simplifying assumptions regarding an average 
probability of detection between different types of error, and this led to the primary 
research hypotheses unable to be proved. Nevertheless, there were 3 important findings.   
 
First, this study created a testing methodology sensitive enough to detect differences in 
the effects on performance between the 1) sequence of observation of patterns, 2) 
presence/absence of a JPA, and 3) Pattern A.  The author reflects that if the main effect of 
a JPA on performance of a concurrent dual verification task were easily identifiable then 
it would likely have been detected long ago, though it is worth noting that there has not 
been any research located on concurrent dual verification either with or without the use of 
JPAs.  Second, the results indicate that concurrent dual verification itself is not 
necessarily as effective a control as presented in the literature (however, some error 
detection is probably better than none in most cases).  One cannot assume that having a 
QA checker in place will have the desired impact on error detection or mitigation, 
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especially for specific types of errors.  Third, the assumption of average probability of 
detection between different types of error may have been demonstrably wrong but the 
error detection probability could be empirically verified within the error construct created 
during this experiment.  Because the probability of detection of different error types has 
not previously been studied in this context, it is hoped that these results are well-received 
by a wide community of practitioners.  In addition, the subtle and complex interactions of 
JPA design, error type, and base error probability identified in this study help to clarify 
the lack of clear findings in past research. 
 
These results can be used as a cautionary tale for processes and tools that QA 
practitioners use to prevent or mitigate human errors.  Once an error is found, the simple 
conclusion is usually to blame the assembler (or checker) without understanding the 
complexity of tasks that both are being asked to perform. Caldwell (2008) reminds us to 
look for patterns of events from multiple causal factors, but this study contributes another 
dimension by recognizing that different types of error may require different mitigation 
techniques.  The common risk matrix (Cox, 2008) describes the likelihood of errors 
occurring against their consequences, but this is independent of the probability of those 
errors being detected during a concurrent checking task.  The likelihood of an error 
occurring can never be zero but if the probability of an error being detected can be 
improved, then an effective use of QA controls might be to improve the chances that 
catastrophic errors do not go unnoticed.  The recognition in this study that different types 
of error have different probabilities of detection, which could then be inserted into a 
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checklist as behavioral cues, might be highly useful as a leverage to the success of both 
JPA design and concurrent dual verification activities. 
 
Both the methodology and results of this study are an effective baseline from which to 
launch future research activities.  Results suggest that a learning effect overshadowed the 
presence of the JPA, therefore a redesigned study to counterbalance this effect might be 
useful.  Repeating the same experiment with a uniform fault type, which would likely 
provide a more constant probability of detection for all faults, may also yield intriguing 
results.  A focus on marking faults, which can be considered signals, might provide an 
attractive opportunity.  Since incorrect markings may fall below the signal detection 
threshold (Swets, 1964; Baker, 1975), such a focused study might extend this essential 
paradigm of vigilance theory (e.g., Mackie, 1964; Kibler, 1965; Stanislaw, 1990; 
Caldwell, 1999).  If a similar experiment equally spaced the faults (possibly by elapsed 
time) throughout the assembly task, then perhaps a vigilance decrement could be studied 
in a number of ways.  It was mentioned previously that fault #12 was designed to address 
findings by Tsao, Drury, and Morawski (1979) and a later study by Tsao and Wang 
(1984) examined faults of different difficulty, suggesting that these faults may have 
different probabilities of detection.  These and other vigilance studies may benefit from 
the recognition of different probabilities of detection for different types of error, both 
within and outside of the concurrent dual verification construct.  Altmann (2002) has 
fundamental areas of overlap with the current research by examining a performance 
decline within the current task as memory decays (or loses activation) to make room for 
encoding the next task.  Similarly, Altmann and Trafton (2007) discuss the effects of 
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delayed response and performance recovery after interruptions.  While this study was 
unable to directly test the activation or interruption recovery concept, given that the 
presence of a JPA is not a repetitive intervention, a future experiment with multiple JPAs 
could address this activation model.  Finally, it is worth noting that the QA checkers in 
this experiment used a simple checklist as the JPA, and future studies may have different 
results with other JPA formats.  Perhaps as a result of such studies, optimal JPA formats 
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Appendix A Pattern A  
 















4528139  1  4521943  1  611226  2 
4528164  3  300901  1  303726  9 
4563682  2  4181142  2  4180814  2 
303221  1  300101  1  300924  4 
371021  3  300401  5  300124  6 
300421  2  300501  2  301024  2 
300521  2  300201  4  300224  7 
4552353  2  4181144  2  362224  2 
4153827  2  300126  2  300324  5 
4118827  2  300326  3  235724  4 
4121739  2  303926  1  300424  4 
4173805  2  4121966  1  300524  2 
4520842  6        Total:  104 
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621628  2  300126  4  4247139  1 
4220632  2  301026  2  300401  4 
4124107  2  3004626  1  300501  2 
4153827  4  302226  1  300724  2 
4118827  2  306226  4  300824  2 
4211183  2  4113220  1  4181143  2 
413221  3  395701  1  300824  2 
365921  2  4218637  1  301024  1 
4162384  1  300701  2  300124  7 
4144003  1  300801  2  300224  12 
304321  1  4181142  3  362224  4 
4157124  2  301001  2  300324  9 
300421  4  300901  6  300424  2 
4129539  9  300201  4  300524  2 
303921  6  300301  4  407024  1 
303721  8  300101  6  3005744  1 
4217795  1        Total:  150 
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Appendix D Job Performance Aid 
Job Performance Aid 
For the Quality Assurance Role 
 Your role as an observer is an essential part of this important task. 
Complex assemblies require a second set of eyes in order to catch any 
errors. 
 Pay attention for the following types of error: 
o An incorrect piece is installed, meaning that it is either the 
wrong size, wrong color, or wrong markings 
o The correct piece is installed, but in the wrong orientation 
o The correct piece is installed, but in the wrong location 
 Feel free to ask questions about the task at any time. If necessary, ask 
the assembler to stop until you are comfortable with proceeding.  
 The assembler should not turn to the next page of the instructions 
without your approval. 
 For each page of the instructions, the order of assembly does not 
matter. 





Appendix E Raw Data 




Participant Gender Age Presentation Order
Pattern A 








































































1 M 49 B without JPA, A with JPA 2 20 27 6 24:46
2 F 40 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 2 53 6 35 1 21 24 1 21 33 18:40 03:42 18:31
3 M 35 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 3 10 6 32 1 19 36 1 20 14 1 20 22 17:12 03:22 16:26 17:04
4 M 28 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 3 18 20 16 16:58
5 F 54 B without JPA, A with JPA 2 42 14 28 1 21 24 1 26 8 23:26 11:46 18:42
6 F 30 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 2 31 11 24 1 16 15 1 18 15 1 22 37 20:06 08:53 13:44 15:44
7 (DQ) F 56 A without JPA, B with JPA
8 M 30 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 4 10 14 47 1 23 41 1 30 31 26:21 10:37 19:31
9 F 35 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 2 50 13 54 1 20 30 1 24 12 21:22 11:04 17:40
10 M 24 B without JPA, A with JPA 2 5 22 14 20:09
11 F 54 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 3 18 6 14 1 14 45 1 17 33 1 18 0 1 18 10 14:52 02:56 11:27 14:15 14:42
12 M 43 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 2 43 5 23 1 13 43 1 15 58 1 16 24 1 16 31 13:48 02:40 11:00 13:15 13:41
13 M 49 B without JPA, A with JPA 2 22 9 49 1 13 23 1 15 12 1 18 53 16:31 07:27 11:01 12:50
14 M 25 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 1 57 4 26 1 12 2 1 13 50 1 14 15 1 14 26 12:29 02:29 10:05 11:53 12:18
15 F 56 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 2 4 2 48 1 10 22 1 16 5 1 19 24 17:20 00:44 08:18 14:01
16 F 39 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 3 36 13 5 1 19 24 1 23 30 19:54 09:29 15:48
17 F 37 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 3 38 7 54 1 20 40 17:02 04:16
18 M 47 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 2 26 5 39 1 12 45 1 14 42 1 15 8 1 15 21 12:55 03:13 10:19 12:16 12:42
19 M 48 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 3 9 6 30 1 16 51 1 17 29 1 17 46 14:37 03:21 13:42 14:20
20 M 65 B without JPA, A with JPA 2 44 14 8 1 19 24 1 19 30 1 21 15 1 25 44 23:00 11:24 16:40 16:46 18:31
21 M 46 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 2 20 4 42 1 14 2 1 14 26 1 14 36 12:16 02:22 11:42 12:06
22 M 55 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 3 7 5 42 1 16 2 1 16 25 1 16 33 13:26 02:35 12:55 13:18
23 F 34 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 2 42 5 49 1 15 53 1 16 27 1 16 36 13:54 03:07 13:11 13:45
24 M 53 B without JPA, A with JPA 3 50 4 38 1 8 8 1 12 42 1 18 51 1 22 22 18:32 00:48 04:18 08:52 15:01




















Participant Gender Age Presentation Order
Pattern A 








1 M 49 B without JPA, A with JPA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 Test subject is red/green color blind
2 F 40 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
3 M 35 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2
4 M 28 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 F 54 B without JPA, A with JPA 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
Only 6 errors, forgot to perform p.2 fault 
correctly
6 F 30 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 2
7 (DQ) F 56 A without JPA, B with JPA
Disqualified due to misunderstanding pre‐
trial instructions
8 M 30 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
9 F 35 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
10 M 24 B without JPA, A with JPA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 F 54 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 3
12 M 43 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 3 Miss #2 became a catch at 14:26
13 M 49 B without JPA, A with JPA 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 2
14 M 25 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 3






16 F 39 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
17 F 37 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 Miss #1 became a catch at 20:09
18 M 47 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 3
19 M 48 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
20 M 65 B without JPA, A with JPA 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 3 Miss #2 became a catch at 19:42
21 M 46 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2
22 M 55 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
23 F 34 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
24 M 53 B without JPA, A with JPA 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 Miss #2 became a catch at 9:12
25 F 58 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 2













Participant Gender Age Presentation Order
Pattern A 







































































1 M 49 B without JPA, A with JPA 29 6 44 37
2 F 40 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 22 35 38 48 1 43 19
3 M 35 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 24 48 25 36 1 33 54 1 38 25 1 40 11 1 44 31
4 M 28 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 20 59 29 14 1 33 21 1 35 21 1 39 12
5 F 54 B without JPA, A with JPA 27 30 41 37 1 41 47
6 F 30 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 23 44 27 10 1 38 16 1 39 16
7 (DQ) F 56 A without JPA, B with JPA
8 M 30 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 31 53 35 25 1 39 28 1 46 39 1 47 39
9 F 35 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 25 4 37 30 1 37 38
10 M 24 B without JPA, A with JPA 23 43 34 2 1 36 24 37 30
11 F 54 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 19 6 19 55 1 27 47 1 34 56 1 38 30
12 M 43 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 18 0 22 52 1 26 54 1 32 54 1 36 29
13 M 49 B without JPA, A with JPA 20 5 22 48 1 29 37 1 31 38 1 31 54 1 32 0
14 M 25 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 15 55 29 59 1 33 13
15 F 56 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 20 14 23 2 1 31 51 1 32 14 1 32 23
16 F 39 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 24 27 27 14 1 36 41 1 36 55 1 37 38
17 F 37 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 21 25 22 17 1 25 39 1 34 41 1 35 48 1 39 59
18 M 47 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 16 59 24 37 1 28 9 1 29 25 1 32 27
19 M 48 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 18 26 19 4 1 25 57 1 29 44 1 29 48 1 31 6 1 34 35
20 M 65 B without JPA, A with JPA 27 18 29 55 1 38 31 1 38 39 1 38 58
21 M 46 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 18 15 25 40 1 31 8 1 34 48
22 M 55 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 17 20 25 51 1 31 55 1 35 53
23 F 34 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 19 22 28 5 1 34 20 1 38 21
24 M 53 B without JPA, A with JPA 24 16 26 44 1 33 5 1 35 10 1 35 35 1 35 44




















































1 M 49 B without JPA, A with JPA 15:31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





3 M 35 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 19:43 00:48 09:06 13:37 15:23 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2
4 M 28 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 18:13 08:15 12:22 14:22 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 1 2
Only 6 errors, forgot to perform p.2 fault 
correctly
5 F 54 B without JPA, A with JPA 14:17 14:07 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1




7 (DQ) F 56 A without JPA, B with JPA
8 M 30 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 15:46 03:32 07:35 14:46 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1
Miss #1 became a catch at 41:58
Miss #3 became a catch at 47:28
9 F 35 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 12:34 12:26 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
10 M 24 B without JPA, A with JPA 13:47 10:19 12:41 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 Miss #1 became a catch at 34:15
11 F 54 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 19:24 00:49 08:41 15:50 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1
12 M 43 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 18:29 04:52 08:54 14:54 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1
13 M 49 B without JPA, A with JPA 11:55 02:43 09:32 11:33 11:49 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 3
14 M 25 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 17:18 14:04 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
15 F 56 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 12:09 02:48 11:37 12:00 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
16 F 39 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 13:11 02:47 12:14 12:28 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
17 F 37 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 18:34 00:52 04:14 13:16 14:23 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 2
18 M 47 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 15:28 07:38 11:10 12:26 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 2
19 M 48 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 16:09 00:38 07:31 11:18 11:22 12:40 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 3
20 M 65 B without JPA, A with JPA 11:40 02:37 11:13 11:21 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
21 M 46 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 16:33 07:25 12:53 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
22 M 55 A with JPA, B without JPA 1 1 18:33 08:31 14:35 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
23 F 34 A without JPA, B with JPA 1 18:59 08:43 14:58 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
24 M 53 B without JPA, A with JPA 11:28 02:28 08:49 10:54 11:19 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 3
25 F 58 B with JPA, A without JPA 1 14:23 02:40 13:40 14:15 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2






Appendix F Fault Types 
Fault #1, detailed in Chapter 3, is reproduced here: 
 
Figure F1: Sample Instructions Page, Depicting Fault #1 (Fault Type 1) 
65 
 





Figure F3 shows a page from the assembly instructions for fault type 2 (Fault #8), which 
is where an incorrect assembly piece is used. The arrow points to the black 2 x 4 piece 
that is replaced by two 1 x 4 pieces in the experimental trial, one of which is shown in 
Figure F4.   
 











Figure F5 depicts fault type 3 (also Fault #3) whereby the correct pieces are used but they 
are not in the correct order.  The arrow shows the correct orientation where the 2 x 2 
piece is in the rear corner of the assembly.  Figure F6, however, indicates the fault 
whereby the 2 x 4 piece is moved such that it appears in the rear corner instead. 
 










Figure F7 shows a red window in the assembly that is correctly installed.  An example of 
fault type 4, which uses a correct part but in the wrong orientation, is seen in Figure F8 
where the window is installed backwards. 
 









Appendix G Minitab Results 
The following data are a direct output from Minitab analyses.  Note that there were two 
separate series of calculations run on 12/9/2013 and 1/2/2014. 
 
—————   12/9/2013 3:35:45 PM   ————————————————————  
 
Results for: Pattern A 
  
Descriptive Statistics: Result  
 
Variable  ErrorNumber       Sum 
Result    1             19.0000 
          2            0.000000 
          3              1.0000 
          4            0.000000 
          5              7.0000 
          6             18.0000 
          7             18.0000 
 
7 column(s) excluded because they have the wrong number of rows. 
Subset worksheet Subset of Pattern A created. 
 
 
Results for: Pattern A wo S1 E2 E4 
  
Binary Logistic Regression: Result versus Sequence, ErrorNumber  
 





Variable  Value  Count 
Result    1         63  (Event) 
          0         52 
          Total    115 
 
 
Logistic Regression Table 
 
                                                 Odds     95% CI 
Predictor         Coef   SE Coef      Z      P  Ratio  Lower  Upper 
Constant       2.97386  0.850309   3.50  0.000 
Sequence 
 BJA          -1.20882  0.821704  -1.47  0.141   0.30   0.06   1.49 
 JAB          -2.06992  0.796186  -2.60  0.009   0.13   0.03   0.60 
 JBA          -1.63687  0.792043  -2.07  0.039   0.19   0.04   0.92 
ErrorNumber 
 3            -5.13880   1.23813  -4.15  0.000   0.01   0.00   0.07 
 5            -2.67489  0.773096  -3.46  0.001   0.07   0.02   0.31 
 6           -0.295419  0.771207  -0.38  0.702   0.74   0.16   3.37 





Log-Likelihood = -48.714 





Method           Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson             16.2009  12  0.182 
Deviance            15.0132  12  0.241 
Hosmer-Lemeshow      7.8827   8  0.445 
 
 
Table of Observed and Expected Frequencies: 
(See Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for the Pearson Chi-Square Statistic) 
 
                               Group 
Value     1     2    3    4    5    6    7     8     9   10  Total 
1 
  Obs     1     0    1    6    7   10    9    11    12    6     63 
  Exp   0.2   0.8  2.1  4.9  7.8  8.7  9.2  12.4  11.2  5.7 
0 
  Obs    11    11   11    5    5    2    3     4     0    0     52 
  Exp  11.8  10.2  9.9  6.1  4.2  3.3  2.8   2.6   0.8  0.3 
Total    12    11   12   11   12   12   12    15    12    6    115 
 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs       Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant    2814     85.9  Somers' D              0.75 
Discordant     343     10.5  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.78 
Ties           119      3.6  Kendall's Tau-a        0.38 
Total         3276    100.0 
 
13 column(s) excluded because they have the wrong number of rows. 
Subset worksheet Subset of Pattern A created. 
 
13 column(s) excluded because they have the wrong number of rows. 
Subset worksheet Subset of Pattern A created. 
 
 
Results for: Pattern A wo E2 E4 
  
Binary Logistic Regression: Result versus Sequence, ErrorNumber  
 





Variable  Value  Count 
Result    1         63  (Event) 
          0         57 
          Total    120 
 
 




                                                 Odds     95% CI 
Predictor         Coef   SE Coef      Z      P  Ratio  Lower  Upper 
Constant       2.84529  0.809862   3.51  0.000 
Sequence 
 BJA          -1.79208  0.776314  -2.31  0.021   0.17   0.04   0.76 
 JAB          -1.99867  0.778398  -2.57  0.010   0.14   0.03   0.62 
 JBA          -1.57763  0.774927  -2.04  0.042   0.21   0.05   0.94 
ErrorNumber 
 3            -4.96722   1.21817  -4.08  0.000   0.01   0.00   0.08 
 5            -2.49396  0.731281  -3.41  0.001   0.08   0.02   0.35 
 6           -0.250882  0.709869  -0.35  0.724   0.78   0.19   3.13 
 7           -0.250882  0.709869  -0.35  0.724   0.78   0.19   3.13 
 
 
Log-Likelihood = -53.394 





Method           Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson             16.4607  12  0.171 
Deviance            15.9309  12  0.194 
Hosmer-Lemeshow      7.2051   8  0.515 
 
 
Table of Observed and Expected Frequencies: 
(See Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for the Pearson Chi-Square Statistic) 
 
                               Group 
Value     1     2    3    4    5    6    7    8     9    10  Total 
1 
  Obs     0     1    4    3    7    8   10    7    11    12     63 
  Exp   0.2   0.8  2.1  4.9  7.7  8.3  8.6  8.9  10.3  11.3 
0 
  Obs    12    11    8    9    5    4    2    5     1     0     57 
  Exp  11.8  11.2  9.9  7.1  4.3  3.7  3.4  3.1   1.7   0.7 
Total    12    12   12   12   12   12   12   12    12    12    120 
 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs       Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant    3030     84.4  Somers' D              0.73 
Discordant     420     11.7  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.76 
Ties           141      3.9  Kendall's Tau-a        0.37 
Total         3591    100.0 
 
  
Binary Logistic Regression: Result versus Sequence, ErrorNumber  
 





Variable  Value  Count 
Result    1         63  (Event) 
          0         57 





Logistic Regression Table 
 
                                                 Odds     95% CI 
Predictor         Coef   SE Coef      Z      P  Ratio  Lower  Upper 
Constant       2.84529  0.809862   3.51  0.000 
Sequence 
 BJA          -1.79208  0.776314  -2.31  0.021   0.17   0.04   0.76 
 JAB          -1.99867  0.778398  -2.57  0.010   0.14   0.03   0.62 
 JBA          -1.57763  0.774927  -2.04  0.042   0.21   0.05   0.94 
ErrorNumber 
 3            -4.96722   1.21817  -4.08  0.000   0.01   0.00   0.08 
 5            -2.49396  0.731281  -3.41  0.001   0.08   0.02   0.35 
 6           -0.250882  0.709869  -0.35  0.724   0.78   0.19   3.13 
 7           -0.250882  0.709869  -0.35  0.724   0.78   0.19   3.13 
 
 
Log-Likelihood = -53.394 





Method           Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson             16.4607  12  0.171 
Deviance            15.9309  12  0.194 
Hosmer-Lemeshow      7.2051   8  0.515 
 
 
Table of Observed and Expected Frequencies: 
(See Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for the Pearson Chi-Square Statistic) 
 
                               Group 
Value     1     2    3    4    5    6    7    8     9    10  Total 
1 
  Obs     0     1    4    3    7    8   10    7    11    12     63 
  Exp   0.2   0.8  2.1  4.9  7.7  8.3  8.6  8.9  10.3  11.3 
0 
  Obs    12    11    8    9    5    4    2    5     1     0     57 
  Exp  11.8  11.2  9.9  7.1  4.3  3.7  3.4  3.1   1.7   0.7 
Total    12    12   12   12   12   12   12   12    12    12    120 
 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs       Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant    3030     84.4  Somers' D              0.73 
Discordant     420     11.7  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.76 
Ties           141      3.9  Kendall's Tau-a        0.37 
Total         3591    100.0 
 
  
Binary Logistic Regression: Result versus Sequence, ErrorNumber  
 







Variable  Value  Count 
Result    1         63  (Event) 
          0         57 
          Total    120 
 
 
Logistic Regression Table 
 
                                                 Odds     95% CI 
Predictor         Coef   SE Coef      Z      P  Ratio  Lower  Upper 
Constant       2.84529  0.809862   3.51  0.000 
Sequence 
 BJA          -1.79208  0.776314  -2.31  0.021   0.17   0.04   0.76 
 JAB          -1.99867  0.778398  -2.57  0.010   0.14   0.03   0.62 
 JBA          -1.57763  0.774927  -2.04  0.042   0.21   0.05   0.94 
ErrorNumber 
 3            -4.96722   1.21817  -4.08  0.000   0.01   0.00   0.08 
 5            -2.49396  0.731281  -3.41  0.001   0.08   0.02   0.35 
 6           -0.250882  0.709869  -0.35  0.724   0.78   0.19   3.13 
 7           -0.250882  0.709869  -0.35  0.724   0.78   0.19   3.13 
 
 
Log-Likelihood = -53.394 





Method           Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson             16.4607  12  0.171 
Deviance            15.9309  12  0.194 
Hosmer-Lemeshow      7.2051   8  0.515 
 
 
Table of Observed and Expected Frequencies: 
(See Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for the Pearson Chi-Square Statistic) 
 
                               Group 
Value     1     2    3    4    5    6    7    8     9    10  Total 
1 
  Obs     0     1    4    3    7    8   10    7    11    12     63 
  Exp   0.2   0.8  2.1  4.9  7.7  8.3  8.6  8.9  10.3  11.3 
0 
  Obs    12    11    8    9    5    4    2    5     1     0     57 
  Exp  11.8  11.2  9.9  7.1  4.3  3.7  3.4  3.1   1.7   0.7 
Total    12    12   12   12   12   12   12   12    12    12    120 
 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs       Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant    3030     84.4  Somers' D              0.73 
Discordant     420     11.7  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.76 
Ties           141      3.9  Kendall's Tau-a        0.37 
Total         3591    100.0 
 
 
Results for: Pattern B 
  




Variable  ErrorNumber       Sum 
Result    1               3.000 
          2              1.0000 
          3              10.000 
          4            0.000000 
          5               3.000 
          6               2.000 
          7              10.000 
 
  
Descriptive Statistics: Result  
 
Variable  ErrorNumber     Sum 
Result    1            5.0000 
          2            10.000 
          3            10.000 
          4            1.0000 
          5            8.0000 
          6            14.000 
          7            14.000 
 
  
Descriptive Statistics: Result  
 
Variable  ErrorNumber       Sum 
Result    1               7.000 
          2              3.0000 
          3             19.0000 
          4            0.000000 
          5              4.0000 
          6              7.0000 
          7             22.0000 
 
13 column(s) excluded because they have the wrong number of rows. 
Subset worksheet Pattern B wo E4 created. 
 
 
Results for: Pattern B wo E4 
  
Binary Logistic Regression: Result versus Sequence, ErrorNumber  
 





Variable  Value  Count 
Result    1         62  (Event) 
          0         80 
          Total    142 
 
* NOTE * 142 cases were used 
* NOTE * 2 cases contained missing values 
 
 
Logistic Regression Table 
 
                                                 Odds      95% CI 
78 
 
Predictor         Coef   SE Coef      Z      P  Ratio  Lower   Upper 
Constant     -0.892876  0.593447  -1.50  0.132 
Sequence 
 BJA         -0.350493  0.636774  -0.55  0.582   0.70   0.20    2.45 
 JAB          0.614972  0.610142   1.01  0.313   1.85   0.56    6.12 
 JBA          0.186810  0.611754   0.31  0.760   1.21   0.36    4.00 
ErrorNumber 
 2            -1.21127  0.776262  -1.56  0.119   0.30   0.07    1.36 
 3             2.15010  0.691037   3.11  0.002   8.59   2.22   33.26 
 5           -0.869622  0.721889  -1.20  0.228   0.42   0.10    1.73 
 6           -0.132053  0.649534  -0.20  0.839   0.88   0.25    3.13 
 7             3.22739  0.879472   3.67  0.000  25.21   4.50  141.33 
 
 
Log-Likelihood = -66.020 





Method           Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson             15.7178  15  0.401 
Deviance            17.4991  15  0.290 
Hosmer-Lemeshow      6.9396   6  0.326 
 
 
Table of Observed and Expected Frequencies: 
(See Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for the Pearson Chi-Square Statistic) 
 
                            Group 
Value     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8  Total 
1 
  Obs     4     1     3     4     6    12    14    18     62 
  Exp   1.8   2.7   3.4   4.8   6.2  11.1  15.3  16.7 
0 
  Obs    14    17    14    14    12     5     4     0     80 
  Exp  16.2  15.3  13.6  13.2  11.8   5.9   2.7   1.3 
Total    18    18    17    18    18    17    18    18    142 
 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs       Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant    4131     83.3  Somers' D              0.69 
Discordant     703     14.2  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.71 
Ties           126      2.5  Kendall's Tau-a        0.34 
Total         4960    100.0 
 
  
—————   1/2/2014 10:11:20 AM   ———————————————————— 
  
 
Welcome to Minitab, press F1 for help. 
Retrieving project from file: 
'C:\PROJECTS\ACTIVE\FOSSHAGE\REDO_2\MINITAB.MPJ' 
 
Results for: Pattern A wo E2 E4 
  









Variable  Value  Count 
RR        1         57  (Event) 
          0         63 
          Total    120 
 
 
Logistic Regression Table 
 
                                                               95% CI 
Predictor        Coef   SE Coef      Z      P  Odds Ratio  Lower    Upper 
Constant     -2.84529  0.809862  -3.51  0.000 
Sequence 
 BJA          1.79208  0.776314   2.31  0.021        6.00   1.31    27.48 
 JAB          1.99867  0.778398   2.57  0.010        7.38   1.60    33.93 
 JBA          1.57763  0.774927   2.04  0.042        4.84   1.06    22.12 
ErrorNumber 
 3            4.96722   1.21817   4.08  0.000      143.63  13.19  1563.68 
 5            2.49396  0.731281   3.41  0.001       12.11   2.89    50.77 
 6           0.250882  0.709869   0.35  0.724        1.29   0.32     5.17 
 7           0.250882  0.709869   0.35  0.724        1.29   0.32     5.17 
 
 
Log-Likelihood = -53.394 





Method           Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson             16.4607  12  0.171 
Deviance            15.9309  12  0.194 
Hosmer-Lemeshow      5.3029   8  0.725 
 
 
Table of Observed and Expected Frequencies: 
(See Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for the Pearson Chi-Square Statistic) 
 
                               Group 
Value     1     2    3    4    5    6    7    8     9    10  Total 
1 
  Obs     0     1    4    3    4    5    9    8    11    12     57 
  Exp   0.7   1.7  3.1  3.4  3.7  4.3  7.1  9.9  11.2  11.8 
0 
  Obs    12    11    8    9    8    7    3    4     1     0     63 
  Exp  11.3  10.3  8.9  8.6  8.3  7.7  4.9  2.1   0.8   0.2 
Total    12    12   12   12   12   12   12   12    12    12    120 
 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs       Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant    3030     84.4  Somers' D              0.73 
Discordant     420     11.7  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.76 
Ties           141      3.9  Kendall's Tau-a        0.37 
80 
 
Total         3591    100.0 
 
 
Results for: Pattern B wo E4 
  
Binary Logistic Regression: RR versus Sequence, ErrorNumber  
 





Variable  Value  Count 
RR        1         80  (Event) 
          0         62 
          Total    142 
 
* NOTE * 142 cases were used 
* NOTE * 2 cases contained missing values 
 
 
Logistic Regression Table 
 
                                                 Odds     95% CI 
Predictor         Coef   SE Coef      Z      P  Ratio  Lower  Upper 
Constant      0.892876  0.593447   1.50  0.132 
Sequence 
 BJA          0.350493  0.636774   0.55  0.582   1.42   0.41   4.95 
 JAB         -0.614972  0.610142  -1.01  0.313   0.54   0.16   1.79 
 JBA         -0.186810  0.611754  -0.31  0.760   0.83   0.25   2.75 
ErrorNumber 
 2             1.21127  0.776262   1.56  0.119   3.36   0.73  15.37 
 3            -2.15010  0.691037  -3.11  0.002   0.12   0.03   0.45 
 5            0.869622  0.721889   1.20  0.228   2.39   0.58   9.82 
 6            0.132053  0.649534   0.20  0.839   1.14   0.32   4.08 
 7            -3.22739  0.879472  -3.67  0.000   0.04   0.01   0.22 
 
 
Log-Likelihood = -66.020 





Method           Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson             15.7178  15  0.401 
Deviance            17.4991  15  0.290 
Hosmer-Lemeshow      6.9396   6  0.326 
 
 
Table of Observed and Expected Frequencies: 
(See Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for the Pearson Chi-Square Statistic) 
 
                            Group 
Value     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8  Total 
1 
  Obs     0     4     5    12    14    14    17    14     80 
  Exp   1.3   2.7   5.9  11.8  13.2  13.6  15.3  16.2 
0 
  Obs    18    14    12     6     4     3     1     4     62 
  Exp  16.7  15.3  11.1   6.2   4.8   3.4   2.7   1.8 
81 
 
Total    18    18    17    18    18    17    18    18    142 
 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs       Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant    4131     83.3  Somers' D              0.69 
Discordant     703     14.2  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.71 
Ties           126      2.5  Kendall's Tau-a        0.34 
Total         4960    100.0 
 
 
Results for: Pattern A wo E2 E4 
  
Binary Logistic Regression: RR versus Sequence, ErrorNumber  
 





Variable  Value  Count 
RR        1         57  (Event) 
          0         63 
          Total    120 
 
 
Logistic Regression Table 
 
                                                               95% CI 
Predictor        Coef   SE Coef      Z      P  Odds Ratio  Lower    Upper 
Constant     -2.84529  0.809862  -3.51  0.000 
Sequence 
 BJA          1.79208  0.776314   2.31  0.021        6.00   1.31    27.48 
 JAB          1.99867  0.778398   2.57  0.010        7.38   1.60    33.93 
 JBA          1.57763  0.774927   2.04  0.042        4.84   1.06    22.12 
ErrorNumber 
 3            4.96722   1.21817   4.08  0.000      143.63  13.19  1563.68 
 5            2.49396  0.731281   3.41  0.001       12.11   2.89    50.77 
 6           0.250882  0.709869   0.35  0.724        1.29   0.32     5.17 
 7           0.250882  0.709869   0.35  0.724        1.29   0.32     5.17 
 
 
Log-Likelihood = -53.394 





Method           Chi-Square  DF      P 
Pearson             16.4607  12  0.171 
Deviance            15.9309  12  0.194 
Hosmer-Lemeshow      5.3029   8  0.725 
 
 
Table of Observed and Expected Frequencies: 
(See Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for the Pearson Chi-Square Statistic) 
 
                               Group 




  Obs     0     1    4    3    4    5    9    8    11    12     57 
  Exp   0.7   1.7  3.1  3.4  3.7  4.3  7.1  9.9  11.2  11.8 
0 
  Obs    12    11    8    9    8    7    3    4     1     0     63 
  Exp  11.3  10.3  8.9  8.6  8.3  7.7  4.9  2.1   0.8   0.2 
Total    12    12   12   12   12   12   12   12    12    12    120 
 
 
Measures of Association: 
(Between the Response Variable and Predicted Probabilities) 
 
Pairs       Number  Percent  Summary Measures 
Concordant    3030     84.4  Somers' D              0.73 
Discordant     420     11.7  Goodman-Kruskal Gamma  0.76 
Ties           141      3.9  Kendall's Tau-a        0.37 



































































Appendix I Assembly Instructions from Pattern B (Lego™ Kit 6167) 
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